Trade and trade policy are central to transforming our world, the objective of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Trade can make a crucial contribution to sustainable development objectives, including economic growth and poverty reduction, but requires a coherent policy framework that links helping businesses harness trading opportunities with managing the social, economic, and environmental impacts of trade. Ensuring policy learning about how trade can contribute to the 2030 Agenda requires robust follow-up and review of the new global framework.
The first aim of this paper is to map where traderelated elements are found in the 2030 Agenda. The second aim is to describe the architecture for followup and review that could support these commitments, and to map where it exists or could be built. The 2030 Agenda in itself will not cause anything to change, let alone ensure policy coherence, but the review process might.
The contribution of trade to the 2030 Agenda is diffuse, which means follow-up and review will be a challenge, but it need not be overly burdensome, and it will be useful. This paper presents options for how progress towards these trade-related commitments could be reviewed over the next 15 years. The process would provide information on progress based on inputs from governments, civil society, and international organisations. This information would be reviewed through self-assessment by states themselves, through peer learning by other governments at the regional level (for example in United Nations regional commissions), and at the global level in multilateral agencies and the High-Level Political Forum, the apex of the follow-up and review process. The point of these review processes is not "evaluation," but the sharing of experiences as a way to facilitate learning and policy improvement.
The paper identifies six clusters of trade-related elements in the 2030 Agenda. These elements range from improving access to trade finance to strengthening the multilateral trading system. They include commitments to the reform of perverse subsidies to agriculture, fisheries, and fossil fuels, and to ensuring that regional trade and investment agreements are coherent with sustainable development. For each cluster, the paper identifies options for indicators, where the necessary data are already collected (if they are) and where progress against these political commitments could be reviewed. The analysis does not pretend to be exhaustive, but to provide a starting point for further discussion.
The paper then presents the information from another perspective, focusing on the potential roles of the various peer review mechanisms, summarised in Box 2. These mechanisms range from multilateral reviews, like the Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization and UNCTAD's voluntary policy peer reviews, to regional mechanisms that could review groups of states, like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or regional economic integration organisations like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
The last part of the paper explains how the various reports could be brought together. Given the profusion of options for review mechanisms, an inter-agency task force on trade could provide an analytical synthesis of reporting and reviews useful for discussions at national, regional, and global levels on the interrelated effects and trade-offs between goals. Trade and carefully designed trade policy can make a crucial contribution to supporting and integrating the three dimensions of sustainable development -economic, social, and environmental -that make up the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ("the 2030 Agenda"). Trade-related elements perfuse both pillars of the 2030 Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development (United Nations, 2015a) , and the outcome document of the third Financing for Development (FfD) conference, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA). 1 Trade-related targets are included in at least 12 of the SDGs. Some are goalspecific, but others see trade as a cross-cutting "means of implementation" (MoI) relevant to the achievement of every goal. In order to realise this potential, trade and other policies must reinforce each other and not work at cross-purposes.
This approach of integrating trade across the development agenda framework makes sense: it reflects the fact that trade has to be part of a coherent policy framework for sustainable development. But trade experts see imperfections in the 2030 Agenda. The SDGs focus on expanding exports, not obtaining high quality imports. Although they recognise, if only implicitly, the importance of maintaining an open trade regime that would allow domestic firms access to low-cost inputs, they do not explicitly address the centrality of services in accessing global value chains (GVCs). The SDGs also devote insufficient explicit attention to things like trade costs that are important for participation in GVCs (Hoekman, 2015) . The 2030 Agenda does recognise that with a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory, and equitable multilateral trading system, as well as meaningful trade liberalisation (in the words of the AAAA, para. 79), trade can serve as an engine of economic growth, not least by encouraging long-term private and public investment in productive capacities. Trade can contribute to reducing poverty, the objective of 1 The UNGA resolution establishing 2030 Agenda incorporates the AAAA as an "integral part" of the 2030 Agenda (United Nations, 2015a, para. 40) . This paper therefore looks at both the SDGs and the AAAA in its analysis of the trade-related elements of the 2030 Agenda.
SDG 1, and promoting sustainable development.
2
According to the AAAA, with appropriate supporting policies, infrastructure, and an educated workforce, trade can promote employment, decent work, and women's empowerment, reduce inequality, and contribute to the realisation of the SDGs. Trade can therefore contribute to the 2030 Agenda's overall objective of "transforming our world," advancing both human development and environmental protection.
These aspirations may be feasible, in theory, but ensuring that trade makes this contribution to sustainable development will take a concerted effort by many ministries within national governments, along with international organisations, civil society, and the private sector. It will require a coherent policy framework both to ensure businesses can take advantage of trade opportunities and also to manage the social and economic adjustments that can result from the competitive pressures of trade and the environmental impacts of changes in economic activity. Follow-up and review of the trade-related elements of the agenda is thus essential: the SDGs in themselves, and the trade-related elements, will not cause anything to change, let alone ensure policy coherence, but the review process might.
The contribution of trade to the 2030 Agenda is pervasive but diffuse, as shown in the Annex, which means follow-up and review will be a challenge. Unlike many aspects of the 2030 Agenda, international trade is covered by numerous bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements, which have their own review mechanisms. 3 Our first aim with this paper is to map where trade-related elements are found in the SDGs and AAAA, and where it can be reviewed. The analysis does not pretend to be exhaustive, but to provide a starting point for further discussion. Even a brief overview of where trade fits, in Box 1 above, shows the scope of the challenge.
Introduction
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Trade in Transforming Our World Options for follow-up and review of the trade-related elements of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
FOLLOW-UP AND REVIEW OF TRADE IN THE 2030 AGENDA
Mechanisms for reviewing progress will be essential to the interconnected challenges of achieving the 2030 Agenda commitments. Having articulated the goals, states have to decide on whose agenda they should be placed. Follow-up mechanisms will enable the world to understand how things are working so that programme adjustments can be made. Review will also allow states to learn from the experience of others; and shed light on whether states are individually and collectively on track to meet their objectives.
Achieving the 2030 Agenda will require coherent systemic support, but most of the needed action on sustainable development is national, even local. In this sense, the new accountability paradigm is bottom-up not top-down. The great achievement of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change is that governments agreed to provide information on what they are doing on climate change, and to allow public scrutiny of such action as well as collective review. The Paris Agreement requires governments to notify their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the UNFCCC Secretariat, along with the steps being taken to implement those NDCs. These notification processes provide an incentive for governments to act to fulfil the expectations created by the notification. Success will require robust surveillance of these notifications at the international level. This type of reporting is about effort not outcomes, but a review process should also ask if objectives are being met and how to identify necessary follow-up. Follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda requires comparing what we have achieved when measured against our initial aspirations and comparing ourselves to our peers. Review should ask if we are meeting our own goals? Are we doing as well as similarly situated communities or countries? Are we trying as hard as we can? What can we learn from the achievements of others, and what can we learn from how others see us? Are we collectively doing enough to support each other in these efforts? What systemic follow-up is needed and from whom? These are the questions that countries, and the international community, should ask themselves.
The purpose of review mechanisms is, thus, to allow consideration of whether national law, policy, and implementation are consistent with each state's aspirations for achieving the SDGs. But the 2030 Agenda is also a universal agenda, in at least two senses: the goals address all countries, at all levels of development, and in many cases will require collective efforts to solve trans-boundary problems (like illegal trade). Regional and global as well as national review will be needed, therefore, because what happens in one part of the world has effects in others, and because of the interrelated effects and trade-offs among the goals. Global review is also needed because countries in different regions or at the same level of development may face similar challenges and, hence, have lessons to share.
The 2030 Agenda is complex with many moving parts -17 SDGs, dozens of targets, hundreds of indicators monitored by dozens of international organisations, and hundreds of think tanks and NGOs. The most important place to review implementation of the SDGs will be at the national level, and it will already be a challenge to facilitate engagement by a range of actors at this level. Regional reviews will allow comparison of similar countries, taking advantage of existing review mechanisms. The task of the new UN (United Nations) High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) on sustainable development, therefore, is to identify obstacles to implementation of the 2030 Agenda and find ways to deal with them. Its role involves orchestration, (Abbott and Bernstein, 2015) , providing incentives and a framework for everyone to participate, coordinating and encouraging the efforts of states, UN entities, business, NGOs -all the stakeholders who should be involved in the process.
Review should identify achievements and critical success factors, support countries in making informed policy choices, and mobilise the necessary means of implementation and partnerships. Mechanisms should build on existing platforms and processes, and be rigorous and evidence-based. We have looked for places where SDG-related data could be enhanced using existing reporting mechanisms, and where existing review mechanisms could continue to function as before, but with a stronger orientation to the 2030 Agenda. The essential objective is to ensure that the new system does not place an excessive burden on states. Our second aim in this paper, therefore, is to describe the architecture for followup and review, and to map where its elements exist or could be built. An overview of this part of the mapping, also based on the Annex, is found in Box 2 below.
Trade in Transforming Our World
Options for follow-up and review of the trade-related elements of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Outline of the argument
In the first section of this paper, we discuss principles for thinking about review mechanisms, followed by a brief discussion in the second section of architectural options for review. The third section reports on a mapping exercise designed to show where trade figures in the SDGs and in the AAAA, global indicators endorsed in March 2016 4 and possible supplementary indicators, and where the necessary data are already collected, if it is. The fourth section describes where trade-related follow-up and review mechanisms already exist, assessing where traderelated reporting can be discussed as a way to learn from the experiences of others, and benefit from the suggestions of peers. While they overlap, the focus of section 3 is on the clusters of goals; the focus of section 4 is on the organisations. Sections 3 and 4 draw on the same detailed mapping in the Annex, but use it in distinct ways. The profusion of options for review mechanisms suggests that some kind of analytical synthesis of reporting at a global level would be helpful. Without such an analytical synthesis, the vital contribution of trade to sustainable development may be obscured. The conclusion, therefore, suggests that an inter-agency task force could be responsible for aggregation of all the trade-related reports for the purposes of discussion of the interrelated effects and trade-offs between goals.
IISD.org
4
The ultimate objective of follow-up and review, according to UN members, is "accountability to our citizens." (United Nations, 2015a, para 74). The purpose is not a state giving an account of itself to foreigners, but a national process of learning; the government, business, civil society of a nation asking themselves whether as a country they are achieving their own objectives under the 2030 Agenda.
What principles and design considerations need to be taken into account in establishing mechanisms? This paper relies on an analytic framework developed by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (Halle and Wolfe, 2015 ; see also Halle, Najam and Wolfe, 2014; IISD, 2014) . It is based on questions to be asked in any analysis of a review mechanism (Mashaw, 2005) . Asking these questions helps us to be sure that we have systematically considered all the salient factors. The questions are:
1. Who is to be reviewed; 2. By whom;
3. About what are they being reviewed;
4. Through what processes is the review to be conducted;
5. By what standards are the relevant policies and practices to be assessed; 6. What the potential effects of the review are, or why review; and, 7. Is the review feasible and practical?
We take these questions in order.
Who is to be reviewed?
Transforming our World, and the resolution creating the HLPF (United Nations, 2013), consistent with the universal nature of the SDGs, specifies that developed countries, developing countries, and relevant United Nations entities would be reviewed. In principle, all bodies with a trade-related mandate could be reviewed, from the World Trade Organization (WTO) to multilateral environmental agreements, like the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 5 In practice the Secretary-General simply calls on other bodies to review their own working methods to ensure that they are supportive of the 2030 Agenda, although quadrennial comprehensive policy reviews (QCPR) of operational activities for development of the United Nations system may well review the performance of UN entities.
By whom?
In this paper we look only at self-assessment by governments and international organisations, review by governments of the actions of other governments, and the role of international organisations in support of reviews. The HLPF will be the apex of a global network of review processes. It is an intergovernmental body, but civil society has access to all documents, has the right to submit documents, and can speak in plenary. Review at other levels is meant to be similarly open and participatory, although it can only happen in accordance with the usual practices of a country or international organisation. 
About what?
The objective is to assess overall progress towards sustainable development, and to know what more needs doing. For the purposes of this paper we have limited ourselves to mapping the trade-related objectives articulated in the SDGs and AAAA, as discussed in the next section. Universality does not preclude both a different substantive emphasis in reviews by country or region, and alignment of reviews with a country's other international obligations. Countries will differ in which goals matter and where they put the emphasis in each cycle. In addition to national reports and reviews of entities, we see a need for review of progress towards aggregated goals expressed at the global level, and of the interrelated effects and trade-offs among goals. 
Through what process?
The process for review includes three transparency mechanisms: generating information, then communicating and reviewing it. The effectiveness of each one depends on the others.
The first transparency mechanism is voluntary reporting of new or changed national measures, and objective indicators of achievement. Information will be more useful if it is generated using a standard set of questions, or template, and if it is made publicly available in a searchable online database. Standardised data are essential for analysts, of course, but countries cannot see how they are doing if they cannot compare themselves to similar countries, and civil society cannot participate without the data.
The second transparency mechanism groups together a set of practices on how governments and international organisations report on their work. Rather than producing information, then, this type of transparency is more about communicating information and listening to the views of stakeholders, including public dissemination of draft reports, opportunity in good time to submit comments, and deliberative opportunities. These two transparency mechanisms correspond to the material in column 3 of the Annex, and are the primary focus of section 3 below.
Information is useless if nothing is done with it. The discussion of reports can be the most valuable part of the process; hence, an essential aspect of follow-up and review will be how states talk about their individual and collective implementation of the goals, including in some cases through some form of peer learning. This third transparency mechanism corresponds to the material in column 4 of the Annex, and is the focus of section 4. 7 Such a review could be based solely on the data provided by the state being reviewed and perhaps supplemented with data provided by a third party (such as an international organisation or a non-governmental organisation -NGO). Alternatively, it could be based on a synthesis report drafted by an international organisation's secretariat or a third party, which would allow broader comparative analysis. Some of the most effective review bodies involve national officials from a given domain, such as the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, where searching questions are often asked about a Member's food safety practices by experts from food inspection agencies. Effective review mechanisms are expensive, time-consuming, and require specific expertise, and they also take time to establish. Making use of existing mechanisms as far as possible will be essential. We, therefore, suggest options for mechanisms for review of different traderelated elements, depending on where expertise on a particular issue appears to reside in the international system.
Criteria / Standard of assessment?
The 2030 Agenda sets out aspirational objectives, not legally "binding" obligations, hence choosing criteria for a review is delicate. It is one thing to ask if a government's actions are consistent with its commitments under the SDGs both at home and internationally, but it is something else to be able to make causal connections between an action and a desired outcome. For example, AAAA paragraph 82 says, "We will endeavour to significantly increase world trade in a manner consistent with the sustainable development goals, including exports from developing countries, in particular from least developed countries with a view towards doubling their share of global exports by 2020 as stated in the Istanbul Programme of Action." Experts will try to quantify the underlined promises, but the ones in bold are about the efforts of governments. Reviewing both efforts and outcomes will be important, though establishing causal connections from one to the other will be difficult, given the attribution problem of knowing if progress towards a goal would have happened anyway.
With what effects on agents?
Why review? As we said above, goals will not change the world but review might. The point of review is not "evaluation" or sanction, but assessment of progress as a way to facilitate learning. The desired effect on actors is to encourage movement towards sustainable development and to ensure follow-up on the SDGs and AAAA, including the means of implementation. Review mechanisms work best where actors have a clear sense of how the results will affect them, and a sense of how to use the results. The assumption is that information can change behaviour. When actors receive new information about themselves, become aware of alternatives, or perceive the social acceptability of particular norms, they may adopt new behaviours. The effects on states of review mechanisms sometimes include both social pressure and learning about appropriate action, both of which can lead to a change in policy, but learning is a bigger incentive than criticism. States change policy not because they fear the consequences of failure to comply (although they might wish to avoid embarrassment for reasons of national pride), but because they have learned about successful action.
Feasibility and practicality
The review process for trade, let alone all the elements of the 2030 Agenda, will be complicated and datadependent. The process will make big demands on the resources of both the governments and the international entities involved. The reporting burden on everyone concerned will be substantial. Countries will differ in the intensity of their participation in the review process given disparities in resources and capacity. If the burden is too high, governments will be unable to do it or will use the burden as an excuse not to report. If the governments and international organisations involved cannot satisfy the follow-up and review requirements, this could undermine the efficacy of the whole 2030 Agenda, which is why we focus on how to use existing review processes as far as possible.
The purpose of follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda is to promote accountability to citizens, support effective international cooperation in achieving the Agenda, and foster exchanges of best practices and mutual learning (United Nations, 2015a, paras 72 and 73). The architecture for follow-up and review will be based on the principles in paragraphs 72-89 of Transforming our World, with more details to be provided in a General Assembly resolution now being negotiated (United Nations, 2016b, hereafter zero draft) on the basis of recommendations released by the Secretary-General at the beginning of the year (United Nations, 2016c, hereafter, the Secretary-General; and see Halle and Wolfe, 2016) . In this section, we sketch the main elements of the architecture based on the principles outlined in the first section of this paper. These elements will be developed in sections 3 and 4.
The 2030 Agenda will be achieved in our communities, not in New York; hence, national review is the foundation of follow-up and review. The aim should be to have a global exchange on national experience. National review has three dimensions: at the national level, in a region, and in New York.
The first dimension is the Voluntary National Review (VNR) as part of the HLPF, which ought to take place at least twice in the next 15 years (zero draft para 8) on the basis of a report by the country concerned. In preparing its report, a country has to be able to ask the questions relevant to its situation, and yet reports have to allow comparability so that others can learn. An annex to the Secretary-General's report suggests sensible guidelines for the voluntary reviews. More could be done, however, to link the work of the whole UN system to national implementation through the process of national follow-up and review. National review could be based on a publicly available government progress report complemented by contributions from civil society, academia, local government, the UN system, the private sector, and other actors.
8 Consistent with the universal agenda, review could include what the country has been doing for itself and its contribution to the achievement of the SDGs and AAAA by other states.
As stressed above, the demands of the review process must not overburden states, especially least developed countries (LDCs); the national review should be kept simple enough not to be an excessive burden because it is the foundation of the bottom-up and universal 2030 Agenda. If national review crumbles, the whole review edifice might fail. Developing countries conducting a review will need help to synthesise and make sense of the vast amount of information. Periodic national reporting and review in many international organisations, such as the WTO, could be synchronised with the national review process both to reduce the burden on countries and to take advantage of work being done anyway.
Constant review prevents anybody from getting anything done, but reviews only every seven or eight years as implied by the zero draft might be too few, with the risk that the long time lapse between reviews might adversely affect progress towards the SDGs. That means that countries should always be reflecting on what they have achieved. This second dimension of national review implies that countries should be conducting their own reviews, with one of them timed to be the basis of its VNR, which implies doing one perhaps every four years, with full support from the UN system as needed.
Finally Transforming our World recognises (A/RES/70/1, para. 80) that peer learning at the regional level, the third dimension of national review, could be useful for creating a conversation among countries in similar circumstances, allowing for learning about successes and difficulties. We think the trade-related goals are especially suitable for consideration at the regional level, given the nature of many value chains, and the importance of regional agreements for trade. Such reviews might be helpful in aggregating and analysing national reviews, using existing strengths and the established review mechanisms in regional bodies, including regional economic integration organisations. Some of these organisations, like the OECD, have special capacity to review their members' contributions to achieving the SDGs (OECD, 2016). Regional economic organisations, like APEC, Caricom or SADC, could also work with multilateral trade organisations to strengthen and align measurement of regional trade. The regional forums on sustainable development also play an important role and could help bring together existing review mechanisms.
Design Options for a Three-Level Review Process
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Options for follow-up and review of the trade-related elements of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Global assessment of progress towards the 2030 Agenda objectives in the HLPF will draw lessons from the national and regional reviews, and from a vast stream of other reporting, allowing for a review of how the system is working. The HLPF mandate provides for a thematic focus of each year's meeting, reflecting the integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development, hence the integrated nature of the SDGs, and the interlinkages between them (United Nations, 2015a, para 85). The zero draft recommends (para 4) the following themes for the first cycle, with related sets of goals to be reviewed in each year: 2017 -Ensuring food security on a safe planet by 2030; 2018 -Making cities sustainable and building productive capacities; and 2019 -Empowering people and ensuring inclusiveness. Consideration of outcomes of the implementation of the AAAA, which could also involve trade, will be a separate part of the HLPF agenda each year.
The annual theme and set of goals to be reviewed could be the means to draw cross-cutting connections through the dizzying array of bodies and reports mentioned in the Secretary-General report. (The Annex to this paper shows just how many bodies and reports could be involved for trade alone.) Participants in the HLPF could not cope with dozens of reports landing on their desks with a thud each year, hence some form of analytic aggregation is going to be necessary as part of a holistic assessment of the 2030 Agenda. Trade as such may never be an annual theme for the HLPF, and yet it should be assessed globally in terms of its overall contribution, and the contribution of trade-related international organisations to achievement of the 2030 Agenda. In the conclusion, we discuss how a separate task force on the traderelated elements of the 2030 Agenda could help to prepare such inputs for the HLPF, including the contribution of trade to the means of implementation.
This section maps trade-related elements across the SDGs and the AAAA, identifying initial and potential supplementary indicators of progress on each topic, where these data are already collected (if they are), and therefore in which forum progress against the various commitments could most easily be reviewed.
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Our analysis includes the global indicators endorsed by the UN Statistical Commission, where useful. These indicators will undergo further technical refinement in the months to come, but are expected to form the basis of global-level review efforts. We also identify possible additional supplementary indicators that governments and other actors could use to complement the global indicators in monitoring progress at national, regional, and global levels. A key challenge in the use of any of the indicators we suggest below will be establishing a base-line against which progress can be measured with a degree of consistency across different indicators and, importantly, between different monitoring bodies. Exploring how this could be done is beyond the scope of this paper, but could be a useful avenue for further work. Section 4 then focuses on the regional and multilateral institutions, summarising the kinds of contributions that could be made to the trade-related aspects of the 2030 Agenda by the various review mechanisms. For a brief summary of selected indicators and review mechanisms, see Box 1 above. The Annex sets out in more detail possible indicators and potential multilateral review mechanisms for the various traderelated elements across the 2030 Agenda.
Trade-related elements are integrated across the SDGs and the AAAA. In the SDGs, almost all of the trade-related targets are listed as "means of implementation:" targets whose achievement would support the realisation of other sustainable development targets. Several trade-related targets are listed as MoI for specific SDGs. For example, correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in global agricultural markets is listed as a MoI target for Goal 2 on ending hunger and achieving food security. Other trade-related targets (for example, 9 We have also drawn on the first UN Inter-Agency Task Force report on follow-up and review of the AAAA (United Nations, 2016d) and a matrix prepared by the Technical Support Team (United Nations, 2015b) as sources of potential indicators and possible review mechanisms. For a review of the range of international agreements relevant to the SDG targets in the context of their follow-up and review, and specific analysis of the international agreements, including on trade, relevant to SDG 2 and SDG 10, see Casaly et al. (2016) .
around market access for least developed countries) are listed under Goal 17 on a global partnership for sustainable development, as a MoI that would support the achievement of the whole set of proposed SDGs. The AAAA includes all of the trade-related MOI targets in the SDGs, but also includes several other trade issues, such as trade finance, regional trade agreements (RTAs), and investment agreements that are useful complements to the SDG targets. This section will look at clusters of the more topic-specific elements, and then at the more systemic trade-related elements across the SDGs and AAAA.
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The first cluster of topic-specific trade elements relates to the reform of subsidies to agriculture (as part of a broad target on the removal of trade distortions in agricultural markets), fisheries, and fossil fuels, along with improved functioning of food commodity markets. 11 Indicators for the reform of agricultural subsidies granted by the advanced economies could include the producer support estimates of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Indicators that would cover OECD members as well as a wider group of countries could be based on WTO notifications. Options for reviewing progress could include the OECD Committee for Agriculture and the WTO Committee on Agriculture including its Sub-Committee on Cotton. Food commodity market functioning could be measured using an indicator of food price anomalies, perhaps supplemented by information drawn from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) system of free market commodity prices, or the inter-agency Agricultural Market Information System. The UNCTAD Trade and Development Commission or Global Commodities Forum could be useful places to review the stability of food commodity prices, as could the FAO Committee on Commodity Problems. 10 The SDGs and AAAA refer in several places to building sustainable tourism (e.g., SDG target 12.b), and to increasing access to basic services (like essential health services in SDG target 3.8, and target 1.4) and financial services (e.g., SDG target 5.a). These references in the 2030 Agenda appear to be more focused on domestic policy rather than international frameworks, and therefore are not included in our formal analysis. Notwithstanding, the broader connections between trade in services and the 2030 Agenda would be worth exploring. 11 On agricultural subsidies: SDG target 2.b and AAAA para. 83; on fisheries subsidies: SDG target 14.6 and AAAA para. 83; on fossil fuel subsidies, SDG target 12.c and AAAA para. 31; on food commodity markets SDG target 2.c and AAAA para. 108.
Mapping the Trade-Related Elements of the 2030 Agenda
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The SDG target on fisheries subsidies is not easy to interpret, but appears to involve: establishing a prohibition on subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing; eliminating subsidies to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; establishing a "standstill" on both of these kinds of subsidies; and recognition of the importance of S&D in the relevant WTO negotiations. The target therefore has two key elements to be measured: progress towards a subsidies prohibition, and progress towards eliminating (and not increasing) the harmful subsidies listed. The official global indicator for this target, which focuses on regulation to address IUU fishing, could be supplemented with measurement of progress towards the establishment of a prohibition on harmful subsidies. This indicator could most logically be reviewed in the WTO, where multilateral negotiations on the topic are underway. With respect to the second element, finding an indicator to measure fisheries subsidies that support overcapacity and overfishing or IUU fishing, and their standstill or elimination, has been very difficult. Data on these subsidies are scarce, and there is no international agreement on which transfers contribute to overcapacity and overfishing. Among the best data available are the OECD's annual reports on government financial transfers to fisheries industries, which cover most OECD Member countries and five additional countries. WTO notifications under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures also provide some, albeit patchy, information. Academic work has provided a working definition of harmful subsidies and estimates (which could be complemented by data from national reports) for most major fishing nations (Sumaila et al., 2013) (Casier et al., 2014) . Options for reviewing progress in reform of fossil fuel subsidies, however defined, could include, at a regional level, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews, IEA Country Reviews, and the G20 Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform Peer Review Process. At the multilateral level, this review could potentially be done through voluntary reporting under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Benninghof, 2013) . The WTO TPRM is well-equipped to draw on data from all these bodies, along with data from civil society.
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The second cluster of trade-related elements in the 2030 Agenda relates to international cooperation around technology for water and sanitation, clean energy, and access to medicines. 13 Trade in goods and services is one potential avenue for the diffusion of environmental technologies. One possible measure of international cooperation around water and clean energy technology is therefore the level of trade in goods and services associated with water management and renewable energy supply and the tariff and non-tariff barriers associated with trade in relevant goods. Other possible measures include the number of trade remedy measures taken against clean energy technologies, on the grounds that these make the technologies more expensive (see Kasteng, 2014) , and the local content requirements related to clean energy projects, which can also increase costs in the short term (see Kuntze and Moerenhout, 2013) . Among the approaches to scoping environmental goods are the list developed by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies (APEC, 2012), the products considered in the negotiations under paragraph 31 (iii) of the WTO's Doha Round, the products in the plurilateral Environmental Goods Agreement negotiations, (Santana, 2015; Vossenaar, 2014 ) and a list developed by the OECD (OECD 2001) . Even if measurement against a single global definition of environmental goods is not feasible, the forums where work is taking place are logical options for reviewing progress, including the WTO CTE, and at a regional level, the APEC Committee on Trade and Investment, the OECD Trade Committee or Joint Working Party on Trade and Environment, and OECD or IEA Country Reviews.
The significance of trade in supporting access to medicines presents a distinct set of policy challenges, linked in the SDGs and AAAA to the use of flexibilities provided under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). While the WTO is probably the most logical mechanism for review of anything related to TRIPS, and governments' acceptance of amendments to it, the World Health Organization (WHO) also has a role in reviewing the intersection between trade and access to medicines and medical technologies (WHO, WIPO, and WTO, 2012) . The potential contribution of trade to global health goes further, however, as most countries rely at least to some extent on imports of medical goods and services in providing health care. Measuring the contribution of trade to access to medicines could therefore go beyond intellectual property rules to encompass the impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports of medicines, and access to medical services (Roberts, 2014) .
A third cluster of trade-related elements in the 2030 Agenda includes related targets and commitments around economic diversification, links to global value chains (particularly for SMEs), sustainable industrialisation, trade finance, and trade facilitation.
14 Economic diversification could be reviewed by examining a country's export diversification, and the diversification of its domestic market. UNCTAD's Voluntary Competition Policy Peer Reviews could provide a review mechanism for domestic competition policy, which supports domestic economic diversification. Assessing the extent of developing country participation in GVCs is a particular challenge (Estevadeordal, Blyde and Suominen, 2014) . The OECD and the WTO have developed substantial databases measuring Trade in Value Added (TiVA) and participation in GVCs; they also measure trade in services, which is an essential element of participation in global value chains. Export diversification could also be reviewed within the TPR country reports.
The AAAA underlines the importance, not only of global value chains, but also of regional economic integration, transport infrastructure, and trade facilitation. Measuring the degree to which trade is facilitated could rely on Trade Facilitation indicators developed by the OECD, and ratification and implementation of the WTO's Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA). Reviews of ratification and implementation of the TFA could take place in the WTO's Trade Facilitation Committee. The Trade Facilitation Committee will also review the support provided to WTO members for the implementation of different commitments. 15 Reviewing progress against the commitment to increased multilateral development bank investment in regional trade and transport infrastructure, would most logically take place through the institutions' own review mechanisms. The AAAA also underlines the importance of trade finance in helping countries to reap the benefits of trade. Trade finance is currently measured largely by regional development banks (the Asian and African Development Banks, in particular) and the Bank for International Settlements. The WTO's Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance and the Expert Group on Trade Financing could play important roles in reviewing efforts to improve access to trade finance, and its impact on trade by developing countries.
Trade in Transforming Our World
Options for follow-up and review of the trade-related elements of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development One issue is missing from the trade-related elements of the 2030 Agenda that belongs with this cluster. Hoekman (2015) argues that a reduction in trade costs is the most important goal for developing countries. An explicit target along the lines he suggests (for example, reduce trade costs for firms operating in low-income countries by X per cent) is not part of the 2030 Agenda, although many of the goals and targets are related to this objective. Measuring trade costs could, therefore, be a useful complement to the existing targets as part of a comprehensive approach to reviewing the trade elements of the agenda. An "outcome" indicator on trade costs, the data for which would need to be developed or adapted from existing sources, could be reviewed as part of the WTO TPRM.
A fourth cluster of trade-related elements in the SDGs and AAAA relates to the illegal extraction of and trade in natural resources and trade in hazardous chemicals and waste. 16 This cluster is particularly interesting for two reasons: first, because data around illegal extraction and trade in natural resources often rely on estimates, and second because in many cases the data that are available and the review frameworks that exist sit outside the traditional trade system. UNEP plays a central role in addressing many of these issues and its Environment Assembly could contribute to monitoring or reviewing progress against a range of objectives. The Basel Convention monitors compliance with its rules on the transboundary movement and disposal of hazardous wastes through its Implementation and Compliance Committee, which reports to the Convention's Conference of the Parties. Basel could, therefore, be a useful follow-up and review mechanism for illegal trade in hazardous materials, although its membership is far from being universal. Similarly, the Meetings of the Parties of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer could be a useful follow-up and review mechanism. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) has much wider membership (181 Parties) but a narrow scope of application, focused on specific lists of endangered species. CITES' Review of Significant Trade relies heavily on data provided by such NGOs as TRAFFIC (Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce). CITES also has a voluntary policy review initiative that is in some respects remarkably similar 16 On IUU fishing, see SDG target 14.4; on poaching and trafficking of wildlife, see SDG target 15.c. AAAA para. 92 references these SDG issues as well as illegal logging and mining and trafficking in hazardous waste and minerals.
to the WTO TPRM. Under Conference of Parties decisions 14.21 to 14.24 "exporting and importing countries are invited to carry out voluntary National Wildlife Policy Reviews in order to facilitate a better understanding of the effects of wildlife trade policies on the international wildlife trade." The WTO CTE has been discussing the trade aspects of illegal logging and illegal fishing in recent years, drawing on the detailed experiences of developed and developing countries. Several regional trade agreements (e.g., the TPP) include commitments to address illegal trade in natural resources, although the strength of their institutions will probably define how useful they will be as forums for effective review.
Turning to the more systemic trade issues, the fifth cluster brings together references to the multilateral trading system under the WTO and references to increasing developing country exports, including through improved market access for least developed countries, and references to capacity-building, including Aid for Trade. 17 While, for obvious reasons, the outcome of the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference of December 2015 (the Nairobi Package) is not referenced in the 2030 Agenda, its implementation is an important part of the overall strengthening of the multilateral system. One of the most significant outcomes at Nairobi, agreement to eliminate agricultural export subsidies, is a crucial part of the implementation of SDG target 2.b. Many of the targets in this cluster already have relevant indicators and datasets in place that could be used to measure progress.
The increasing membership of the WTO provides a sense of how universal the multilateral system is, and information about the length of time accessions take should be relatively easy to gather within the organisation. Progress on the stalled WTO Doha Round and implementation of the 2013 Bali Package and 2015 Nairobi Package, including the Agreement on Trade Facilitation and LDC-specific issues (e.g., the degree of duty-free quota-free (DFQF) market access provided to LDCs, implementation of simple and transparent rules of origin (ROO) and of the LDC services waiver decision) and the removal of export subsidies in agriculture, would probably Developing countries' participation in world trade could be measured using existing data from the ITC, UNCTAD, and the WTO on developing country and LDC exports and imports (by partner group and key sectors), including services, average tariffs faced by developing countries and LDCs in key sectors, and the degree to which developing and least developed countries use tariff preferences extended by import markets. Progress against all of these indicators could be reviewed in the WTO's Committee on Trade and Development and its Sub-Committee on LDCs. Levels of global protectionism and the openness of the trading system could be measured using average bound and applied tariff rates. Changes in levels of protectionism could be reviewed in several places, including the WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism (in Member reviews and its overall review report) and in peer reviews between members of the G20 group (building on reports by international agencies).
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Through the over-arching Aid for Trade initiative, the WTO seeks to mobilise support for developing and least developed countries so that they can overcome supply-side and trade-related infrastructure constraints and benefit from enhanced market access opportunities. 20 The OECD maintains a database of information on Aid for Trade transfers per donor and per recipient. OECD and WTO should continue to produce biannual reports on these transfers. The sixth cluster includes references to policy coherence at various levels, including between regional and multilateral trade rules and in domestic policy. 21 Regional trade and investment agreements are mentioned explicitly only in the AAAA, which includes language on strengthening regional cooperation and trade agreements, and ensuring that trade and investment agreements do not constrain domestic sustainable development policies. 22 This area in the context of the trade-related elements is one where UN regional commissions and regional economic integration organisations could play a particularly important follow-up and review role. Measuring regional integration could be done using indicators developed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Capannelli, Lee and Petri, 2009) ; the "depth" of regional trade agreements and their consistency with the multilateral trading system could be reviewed by the OECD with respect to the possible exclusionary effects on third countries of regional agreements among its Members, or through review in the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA). The consistency of investment agreements with sustainable development objectives and the multilateral trading system could also be reviewed as part of UNCTAD's Investment Policy Reviews. Measuring whether a domestic policy environment "enables" trade is not simple, but one potential indicator could be drawn from the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA), which assess a country's overall domestic policy environment. This indicator is currently used primarily in assessing very poor countries, but could perhaps be extended.
In the previous section we mapped the key traderelated aspects of the SDGs and AAAA, suggesting where to find data for each one and where that data might be reviewed. We now reverse the lens, mapping the most significant trade-related review mechanisms and discussing how their current -or potentially augmented -review functions could contribute to the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda. Generating the data for the indicators designed to provide an overall snapshot of the SDGs is not the same as ensuring that some body of states meeting under the auspices of an international organisation reviews whatever information is available to them. Indicators serve the process, but they do not explain themselves. What matters is how states learn, and that happens through discussion at all levels, both of specific elements of the agenda and of how they all fit together as a coherent whole. Box 2 is a list of the obvious places where review of different trade-related elements across the 2030 Agenda can take place. We discuss each one in turn.
World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization is central to the daily life of the trading system, and it is central to reviewing the contribution of trade to the 2030 Agenda. The AAAA invites the WTO General Council to "consider how WTO can contribute to sustainable development." At their last ministerial in Nairobi, ministers said (WTO, 2015a) that "We recognize the role the WTO can play in contributing towards achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, in so far as they relate to the WTO mandate, and bearing in mind the authority of the WTO Ministerial Conference." The WTO's website includes a short summary of some of the explicit and implicit connections between trade and the WTO and the SDGs, including connections between trade and growth and prosperity, ending hunger, dissemination of clean energy technologies, and sustainable tourism. So far, however, there has not been much public discussion about what the role of the WTO should be in supporting the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, and in reviewing progress towards the Agenda's objectives. 23 In this section we describe some ways in which the WTO could play the role that ministers recognised.
Formal rounds of negotiations and resort to the dispute settlement system are two traditional ways of thinking about the role of the WTO, but the third dimension of ongoing WTO work, which can be broadly grouped as transparency and accountability mechanisms, is the most important for followup and review (Wolfe, 2013) . One way that WTO Members could enhance the work the Secretariat does for them is by asking it to facilitate an integrated discussion of the ways that those mechanisms could contribute to achieving the trade-related objectives of the 2030 Agenda. Such a role is consistent with the preamble of the WTO Agreement, which places all its objectives in the context of "allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and enhance the environment." While this work arguably falls within the mandate of the bodies discussed below, it might make sense for the chair of the General Council to write to the chairs of all WTO bodies asking how they intend to internalise the SDGs in their work. Playing its part in advancing those elements of the 2030 Agenda relevant to its mandate represents an important opportunity for the WTO as an institution to become more involved in broader cooperation around development, which could support efforts towards policy coherence.
Many WTO bodies could contribute to follow-up and review. The WTO CRTA using its Transparency Mechanism could consider a horizontal review of sustainable development chapters in regional trade agreements. Such questions seem especially relevant in the case of the so-called mega-regionals, from which most developing countries are excluded. It could also consider whether trade and investment treaties constrain domestic policies for sustainable development. Ministers made an interesting advance in this direction at the 2015 Nairobi ministerial, instructing the CRTA "to discuss the systemic implications of RTAs for the multilateral trading system and their relationship with WTO rules." (WTO, 2015a, para 28). The committee was previously reluctant to discuss cross-cutting issues (horizontal) as opposed to particular RTAs (vertical). The CRTA Secretariat (part of the Trade Policy Review division) prepares working papers which could inform the TPR reports.
Mapping Trade-Related Review Mechanisms
The WTO Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) monitors several trade elements related to the 2030 Agenda. The S&D Monitoring Mechanism, which operates in dedicated sessions of the CTD, was created in 2013 to act as a focal point within the WTO to analyse and review the implementation of all special and differential treatment provisions with a view to facilitating integration of developing and least developed Members into the multilateral trading system (WT/L/920). The CTD also reviews implementation of the DFQF commitment undertaken as part of the Bali Package, and, through the Preferential Trade Arrangements Transparency Mechanism, collects information about non-reciprocal preference agreements and preference utilisation. The CTD Sub-Committee on LDCs conducts an annual review of market access provided to LDCs on the basis of a Secretariat report (WTO, 2014a) . It also discusses technical assistance provided by the WTO to LDCs and capacity-building such as the EIF, and it monitors LDC accessions.
The most comprehensive body for trade-related peer review is the WTO Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) since its analytic reports on individual countries and on the trading system can draw on information from all other bodies, including non-state actors, with regular opportunities for discussion by all Members of the WTO. The main work of the TPRB is the discussion of the periodic Trade Policy Review reports on every Member. The four largest traders are reviewed every two years, the next sixteen every four years, and the rest every six years. The schedule could be aligned, if not perfectly, with the schedule of national reviews of the 2030 Agenda, ensuring that review of the trade-related aspects does not add to the reporting burden on governments, and allowing the national report to benefit from the results of peer review in the WTO.
The TPR process has two reports. The first is written by the government of the country concerned. The recent report by the Government of India (WT/ TPR/G/313) covers such SDG-related topics as "Agriculture and food security," "Infrastructure development," "Ease of doing business," "Reforms in foreign direct investment policy," "Rationalising subsidies," "Trade facilitation measures," and the country's preferential trade agreements. The second report is prepared by the Secretariat using a standard template on the basis of interviews and exchanges with government officials, regular WTO notifications, reports by other international organisations and NGOs, and other sources of publicly available information. In the case of the recent Secretariat report on India (WT/TPR/S/313), it begins with sections on the "Economic environment" and on the "Trade and investment regime." This section covers such things as engagement in the multilateral trading system, regional and preferential agreements, and foreign investment. Here the Secretariat could also ask the Member under review if it has integrated trade policy into the national sustainable development plan.
The section of the TPR on "Trade policies and practices by measure" covers not only tariffs, but several other aspects of trade policy that could be relevant to the 2030 Agenda, such as import and export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing, including those necessary to implement CITES restrictions on wildlife trade. This section also covers tax incentives, explicit subsidies, competition policy, and price controls, including measures to ensure access to essential medicines, government procurement, and intellectual property rights. This section of the country TPR could take up Hoekman's suggestion to provide aggregate information from a variety of sources on any reduction in trade costs (Hoekman, 2015) . The TPRB then conducts a review of the Member's trade policy based on the government and the Secretariat reports. Members ask questions and receive oral and written answers, which are later published along with the minutes of the meeting. The Chair of the TPRB issues concluding remarks.
The TPRB also provides the platform for discussions among WTO Members of the two monitoring reports produced by the WTO Secretariat each year (see, for example WTO, 2015b). These reports provide an overview of trends in the multilateral trading system over six and twelve month periods, in particular developments in the implementation of trade policies of Members. The reports also review the work of the WTO itself in such areas as compliance with transparency and notification provisions as well as trade concerns raised in meetings of WTO bodies. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCTAD has particular strengths in gathering and analysing data on national and global investment trends, and international investment agreements, as well as the particular interests of developing countries in trade policy. The main advantage of UNCTAD's existing peer review processes is that they are voluntary, therefore exemplifying national ownership of the process and imposing a more manageable burden on developing countries' public resources than regular mandatory peer reviews. In addition to the Trade and Development Commission, UNCTAD can contribute through Investment Policy Reviews, the Voluntary Competition Policy Review, and the Global Commodities Forum. Given the breadth of UNCTAD's membership, it provides a wide range of countries with the opportunity to have their policies reviewed, to better inform the national process discussed in section 2 above. On the other hand, a wider review role could be enhanced by improvements to the organisation's institutional capacity and an increase in developed countries' relatively lower level of engagement in its work.
While the details of a process are yet to be determined, the UNCTAD Secretariat (UNCTAD, 2015) has begun to consider questions that could shape review of governments' trade and sustainable development policies, including: 
World Bank
The World Bank could serve as an important source of data and analysis on the trade-related elements of the 2030 Agenda using its immense data collection and analysis capacity -many of the indicators referenced in the Annex build on the Bank's work. The Bank could play an important potential role in reviewing 
Regional review
As we suggested above, aggregation and review at the regional level, creating a conversation among countries in similar economic or geographic circumstances, could provide a particularly rich environment for frank discussion, experience-sharing, and learning.
The UN Regional Commissions (notably United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)) are already thinking about their roles in supporting the implementation and review of the 2030 Agenda, including through Regional Forums for Sustainable Development (United Nations 2015c). Many regional economic integration bodies (like APEC) already conduct reviews of Members' trade and trade-related policies, as does the African Peer Review Mechanism; like the UN regional commissions, they could potentially provide a good environment for further discussion of the contribution of those trade-related policies to sustainable development. A potential disadvantage of these organisations, however, is that not all of their secretariats have the capacity to support a follow-up and review process. The regional development banks, in concert with the World Bank, could also play a role in reviewing the traderelated elements of the 2030 Agenda. Data collection, analysis, and review may be easier to mobilise at the regional level, perhaps following the model of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in follow-up and conducting policy reviews at country level.
In this context we consider the OECD (as well as the IEA) to be a regional body since its membership is far from universal. But it will be invaluable in reviewing the progress of its members to achieving the 2030 Agenda. 24 Peer review is deeply embedded in the work of the OECD, drawing on the Secretariat's considerable capacity for data gathering and analysis. For several of the trade-related elements of the SDGs 24 The OECD review mechanism options build on the ideas set out in OECD 
Conclusion: Bringing All the Reports Together
Our aim with this paper was to provide a summary of the many options for indicators, reports, and mechanisms that might be useful in follow-up and review of the implementation of the trade-related elements of the 2030 Agenda. The principles set out in section 1 above help to assess these options, but choices will depend on the objectives the reader wishes to pursue.
We have mentioned a great many reports in this paper. We conclude, therefore, by trying to sketch how they all fit together in the architecture described in section 2 above. The main thing to keep in mind is that in this networked approach, multiple reports will be prepared, and they will be used in more than one place. As the Secretary-General says, "It will be important to help the HLPF to derive political guidance from the multiple inputs it will receive. The secretariats… must work coherently to support effective global review." The report is silent, as is the zero draft, on how such coherence will be achieved. We see two nodal points.
First, the national review process every four years is fundamentally a self-assessment by the country concerned, but the national conversation envisaged by Transforming our World requires information. The review processes discussed above ought to be an invaluable source of such information on each country, if properly aggregated and synthesised. Developing countries conducting a review will need help to synthesise and make sense of them all. But country-based reporting is only one of the streams of follow-up and review that will culminate in the HLPF.
Second, achievement of the SDGs will also require a discussion at the global level, both of progress in individual countries and of regional successes, and a discussion of the interrelated effects and tradeoffs. For example, reduction of distortions in world agricultural markets is linked to efforts to improve food security and sustainable agriculture; efforts to reduce fisheries subsidies can have an effect on efforts to reduce poverty. Given the plethora of data and options and places where trade-related elements of the 2030 Agenda could be reviewed, the outcomes of these reviews, should they take place in different forums, would probably be most useful to the HLPF if they were analytically aggregated (Halle and Wolfe, 2016) . Guidelines could be developed on how to synthesise international organisation reporting on goals or clusters of goals, or on the annual HLPF theme. If agencies also focused their annual reporting on the HLPF theme, that would minimise the duplication of work.
The HLPF declaration every year creates the opportunity for a political statement on the overall assessment of progress towards sustainable development, and new or emerging issues with longterm implications. Discussion of the role of trade should be a part of each annual declaration, but this will require a high-level synthesis of available information about trade and its contribution to that year's thematic review. In light of the inevitable complexity and distinct areas of expertise in each trade-related review forum, an additional option could be the creation of an inter-agency Trade and the 2030 Agenda group (perhaps building on the work that several trade organisations undertook as part of the UN Technical Support Team, or the UN Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity) to prepare both a synthesis report as needed for the national reviews; and an annual synthesis for the global level reviews. We showed in section 4 that while many UN entities have a trade-related role, the body with the most significant review capacity is the WTO. One option, therefore, is that the WTO could be asked to coordinate such a task force. The aim of such a thematic report on the trade-related elements of the 2030 Agenda would be to keep attention on the trade policy "forest" as opposed to all the "trees." As with all the other reports we have discussed, it should be a public document -the foundation for an open and participatory process for review and follow-up of the sustainable development agenda. 2.c Adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives and facilitate timely access to market information, including on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme food price volatility 108. We are concerned about excessive volatility of commodity prices, including for food and agriculture and its consequences for global food security and improved nutrition outcomes. We will adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives and call for relevant regulatory bodies to adopt measures to facilitate timely, accurate, and transparent access to market information in an effort to ensure that commodity markets appropriately reflect underlying demand and supply changes and to help limit excess volatility of commodity prices. In this regard, we also take note of the Agricultural Market Information System hosted by FAO. 
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Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
12.c Rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in accordance with national circumstances, including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies, where they exist, to reflect their environmental impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse impacts on their development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected communities 31. We reaffirm the commitment to rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in accordance with national circumstances, including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies, where they exist, to reflect their environmental impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse impacts on their development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected communities.
IAEG-SDGs 12.c.1 Amount of fossil fuel subsidies, per unit of GDP (production and consumption), and as proportion of total national expenditure on fossil fuels 83. We call on WTO members to also commit to strengthening disciplines on subsidies in the fisheries sector, including through the prohibition of certain forms of subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Agenda and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.
Progress in the adoption of a prohibition on certain forms of subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and over-fishing.
IAEG-SDGs 14.6.1: Progress by countries in the degree of implementation of international instruments aiming to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.
Levels of government financial transfers to the fishing industry (OECD) Cluster 2: Access to water, energy, and medicines (continued) * Work in progress -see World Bank Group and World Trade Organization (2015) . 87. We recognize the significant potential of regional economic integration and interconnectivity to promote inclusive growth and sustainable development, and commit to strengthening regional cooperation and regional trade agreements. We will strengthen coherence and consistency among bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements, and to ensure that they are compatible with WTO rules.
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Degree of regional economic integration (regional integration indicator by ADB, regional integration index by AfDB with AU Commission and UNECA)
Number of "deep" or "expansive" regional trade agreements and MTS consistency (OECD) 
